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Much of the current debate on competitive markets centers on whether state and 
local regulations that impede emerging industry competitors (such as Airbnb, 
Tesla, or Uber) and restrict occupational entry serve the public interest. This focus 
on government restraints on competition implicitly discounts private efforts to 
create closed markets—whether it is by the world’s largest bookseller or the 
country’s leading broadband provider. Listening to many politicians, lawyers, and 
economists talk these days, a layperson could be forgiven for assuming a 
competitive economy is one free from state intervention.1 But that is not the case—
state actors establish the rules necessary for markets to function and thereby 
inevitably shape economic life.2 And sometimes, it is only through public 
intervention that competition can be maintained against private forces seeking to do 
away with it. 
Furthermore, government regulations that limit market competition are not 
inherently harmful and can, in fact, advance important social goals. For example, 
“Buy American” rules can, by restricting competition from foreign producers, 
promote full employment in a depressed economy. Importantly, the government is 
(at least somewhat) responsive to popular and electoral pressure when making 
policy, often in the face of conflicting social goals. On the other hand, today’s 
private empires, such as Amazon, Comcast, and Google, have the power, like 
Standard Oil and American Tobacco a century ago, to exclude competition and 
entrench their dominance to profit at the expense of the public. Unlike democratic 
governments, however imperfect, large corporations face little public 
accountability, and also few constraints in the marketplace. Monopolists and 
oligopolists do what is in their interests, regardless of the consequences for the rest 
of us. 
Affirmed in April 2015 by the Eleventh Circuit,3 the Federal Trade 
Commission’s decision on the monopolization of the domestic iron pipefittings 
industry4 offers valuable insight on public and private power in the market. The 
fittings manufacturer, McWane, exploited the Buy American provision in the 2009 
stimulus program to preserve a monopoly. The government restricted foreign 
competition on stimulus projects to help the ailing U.S. economy, while McWane 
closed the pipefittings market to bolster its own bottom line. This little-known 
episode suggests that academic and popular discussions are unduly cynical toward 
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1 Maurice E. Stucke, Better Competition Advocacy, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 951, 954 
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2 See generally BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT 
AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER (2011). 
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government limits on competition. At the same time, such dialogue is also too 
tolerant of private restrictions on competition and attests to the need for a more 
balanced perspective. Government action—through renewed enforcement of 
antitrust laws and other competition rules—is critical to protecting markets against 
privately erected barriers to competition. 
 
I. THE GREAT RECESSION AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE 
 
The bursting of the housing bubbles in many nations and the consequent 
financial crisis in September 2008 shook the global economy. In late 2008, we 
appeared to be on the verge of a second Great Depression. Rising house prices had 
previously allowed people to borrow against their home equity to finance the 
purchase of a new car or higher education for their children. Due to the evaporation 
of trillions of dollars in housing wealth,5 consumer spending experienced a sharp 
decline,6 and private investment collapsed.7 The abrupt fall in the annual demand 
for goods and services—a $1.2 trillion decline in the United States alone8—had 
devastating effects.  Millions of people around the world lost their jobs and had to 
obtain public assistance. For Americans, not only could they no longer use their 
housing wealth to fund consumption and investment, but more than four million 
families would lose their homes through bank foreclosures in the coming years.9  
With the fall 2008 bailouts and ongoing government support protecting the large 
banks from failure, President Obama, upon taking office, declared that reviving the 
American economy was his highest priority. Congress passed the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act, colloquially known as “the stimulus,” which 
provided $800 billion to prop up demand in the U.S. economy.10 Given the weak 
state of the economy six years later, the value of the stimulus remains disputed in 
popular debate. Among economists, however, there is broad consensus that the 
stimulus helped revive the economy and averted a much worse catastrophe.11 Only 
the government was in a position to compensate for the collapse in private 
spending and put the unemployed millions back to work. 
                                                                                                             
 
5 Roger C. Altman, The Great Crash, 2008, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Jan. 2009), available at 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2009-01-01/great-crash-2008. 
6 Graph: Personal Consumption Expenditures, ECONOMIC RESEARCH: FEDERAL RESERVE 
BANK OF ST. LOUIS (2015), http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/?id=PCE.   
7 Graph: Net Domestic Investment: Private: Domestic Business, ECONOMIC RESEARCH: 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS (2015), http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/ 
?id=W790RC1Q027SBEA. 
8 Dean Baker, Obama’s Stimulus Failure, GUARDIAN (Dec. 19, 2011), 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/dec/19/obama-stimulus-
failure-dean-baker. 
9 More U.S. Home Foreclosures Competed in March, REUTERS (Apr. 30, 2013), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/30/usa-housing-corelogic-
idUSL2N0DG1JS20130430. 
10 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, 
208; Christina D. Romer, The Fiscal Stimulus, Flawed but Valuable, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 
2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/21/business/how-the-fiscal-stimulus-
helped-and-could-have-done-more.html?_r=0. 
11 Justin Wolfers, What Debate? Economists Agree the Stimulus Lifted the Economy, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/upshot/what-debate-
economists-agree-the-stimulus-lifted-the-economy.html?smid=tw-share&_r=2. 
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The stimulus law included a controversial Buy American provision. This rule, 
subject to select narrow exceptions, required federally financed construction 
projects, for instance, to use domestic concrete and steel.12 Federal contractors 
generally had to buy American goods even when imports were substantially 
cheaper. Some criticized this requirement as “protectionist” and claimed it 
undermined global free trade.13 The Economist even compared Buy American to 
the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930,14 which (supposedly) made the Great 
Depression much worse.15 
Despite the negative reaction from some quarters, Buy American had 
macroeconomic logic and was overall desirable in a deeply depressed economy. 
The U.S. government spent nearly a trillion dollars on stimulus, and ran a deficit of 
close to $1.5 trillion in 2009.16 Buy American directed the government’s 
extraordinary spending toward domestic producers and helped put unemployed 
individuals and idle factories in the United States back to work. Paul Krugman 
wrote in February 2009 that without Buy American, “[m]y fiscal stimulus helps 
your economy, by increasing your exports—but you don’t share in my addition to 
government debt.”17 American voters would have been justified in asking: Why 
should the government take on large amounts of additional debt to help workers in 
Germany—instead of workers in the United States? And even from the narrow 
perspective of “economic efficiency,” the gains from domestically focused fiscal 
stimulus likely swamped the losses from mildly protectionist trade practices.18 
 
II. MCWANE PROTECTS ITS MONOPOLY 
 
With the stimulus disbursing billions for water and other infrastructure projects, 
the Buy American requirement created a problem in one manufacturing segment: 
iron pipefittings. Pipefittings connect the thousands of miles of high-pressure pipe 
that provide us with clean water. They are at the heart of a largely invisible—but 
essential—system. After decades of losing market to low-cost imports from Brazil, 
China, and India, most domestic manufacturers of iron pipefittings had gone out of 
business. Only one company, McWane, still had domestic manufacturing capacity. 
As a result, the stimulus law temporarily conferred a monopoly on the company. 
When it came to iron pipefittings, Buy American meant Buy McWane. 
                                                                                                             
 
12 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1605, 123 
Stat. 115, 303. 
13 Daniella Markheim, Buy American Hurts America, HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Jan. 30, 
2009), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/01/buy-american-hurts-america. 
14 Trade Policy: Buying American, ECONOMIST (Jan. 29, 2009), available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/13031019. 
15 The Battle of Smoot-Hawley, ECONOMIST (Dec. 18, 2008), available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/12798595. 
16 Graph: Federal Government Budget Surplus or Deficit, ECONOMIC RESEARCH: 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/ 
?id=M318501A027NBEA. 
17 Paul Krugman, Protectionism and Stimulus, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2009, 4:47 PM), 
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/01/protectionism-and-stimulus-wonkish/. 
18 The Nobel Prize-winning economist James Tobin captured this idea in economic terms 
as “[I]t takes a heap of Harberger triangles [economic loss from protectionism] to fill an 
Okun gap [losses from unemployment].” James Tobin, How Dead is Keynes?, 15 ECON. 
INQUIRY 459, 468 (1977). 
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Fortunately, McWane’s monopoly did not seem destined to last for long. Soon 
after the stimulus was passed, other suppliers recognized a big opportunity and 
swung into action. Because these competitors had relied exclusively on foreign 
foundries up until then, they had to establish a domestic manufacturing presence to 
capture a share of the stimulus pot. They had three options: (1) build a foundry 
from scratch, (2) purchase an existing foundry, or (3) contract with an independent 
foundry that produced pipefittings as well as other iron products. The third route 
would be the most expedient but would not allow new entrants to produce fittings 
as efficiently as McWane. Independent contracting has several disadvantages, 
including “less specialized and efficient equipment; smaller batch sizes; [and] 
additional logistical costs associated with inventory, finishing, and freight.”19 To 
compete effectively with McWane, rivals would need to operate their own 
facilities. 
Just as rivals sensed an attractive opportunity, McWane recognized the threat to 
its monopoly in domestic fittings and feared that its margins would “get[] 
creamed”20 by the competition. If competitors successfully entered the market, they 
could undercut McWane’s prices. Purchasers of pipefittings would have some 
choice and not have to accept monopolistic terms. Instead of enjoying the life of a 
quiet (and well-rewarded) monopolist, McWane would have to compete to retain 
business and sacrifice profits in the process. 
As the Federal Trade Commission found in a February 2014 decision,21 upheld 
by the Eleventh Circuit, McWane moved quickly to smother the emerging 
competition and perpetuate its monopoly. Pipefittings are sold almost exclusively 
through dealers. These distributors offer “one-stop shopping” for contractors, 
municipalities, and others involved in the construction and maintenance of 
waterworks. Due to the substantial advantages of selling through dealers, direct 
sales are generally infeasible. McWane used this industry structure to its advantage. 
It gave dealers an ultimatum: carry only McWane’s domestic fittings or face 
painful consequences. The penalties would be a denial of future access to 
McWane’s fittings and also a forfeiture of rebates that dealers had earned on past 
purchases. 
Because of the lack of competition, distributors had little choice. McWane 
already produced a full line of pipefittings whereas the new domestic competitors, 
at least initially, could offer only a partial line. Stick with the established 
monopolist or throw one’s lot with a fledgling newcomer? It was not a difficult 
decision for distributors. McWane used its existing monopoly power to compel its 
distributors to forsake budding rivals.  
With distributors acquiescing to its demand not to carry the products of rivals, 
McWane’s strategy proved successful. Two companies that had considered 
entering the domestic fittings market opted against doing so in the face of McWane 
preemptively blocking access to distribution paths. The one company that did enter, 
Star, was effectively marginalized. Star obtained a small market share due to two 
events: a minor exception in McWane’s distribution policy, and McWane 
terminating a national distributor after one of its local branches decided to carry 
Star’s fittings. 
                                                                                                             
 
19 In re McWane, Inc., 2014 FTC LEXIS 28, 2014-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) P78,670, *70 
(F.T.C. Jan. 30, 2014). 
20 Id. at *88. 
21 Id. at *118. 
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With this limited market access, Star could not build the sales volumes 
necessary to operate its own pipefittings foundry. It had to rely instead on higher 
cost, nonspecialized independent foundries and was severely hobbled in its 
competition against McWane. By depriving Star and other potential rivals of 
sufficient dealer outlets, McWane effectively nipped the competitive threat in the 
bud and maintained its monopoly power. 
 
III. THE MCWANE MATTER:  
THE INTERSECTION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ECONOMIC POWER 
 
McWane’s monopolization of the domestic iron pipefittings industry is the 
result of two efforts to create closed markets—one public, one private. Through the 
Buy American provision in the fiscal stimulus, the federal government excluded 
foreign competitors from an important market for goods. This policy prohibited 
Asian, European, and other firms abroad from competing to supply federal 
contracts worth billions of dollars in 2009 and 2010. Even though it was 
protectionist, Buy American provided public benefits during a depression. It 
channeled the government’s deficit spending toward the employment of 
Americans. 
Following the enactment of Buy American, McWane erected a protective wall 
around its newfound monopoly. The company used its power as the sole domestic 
incumbent to compel dealers into carrying only its products and foreclose 
competition. It closed wholesale distribution channels to nascent competitors. 
McWane’s exclusionary conduct, unlike Buy American, had no offsetting benefits. 
McWane extracted private wealth from the public purse. Because of McWane’s 
successful monopolization, the federal government indirectly paid more for 
domestic iron pipefittings than it would have in a competitive market. 
When evaluating the role of the state in the market, it must be remembered that 
the market is not a realm of “natural order.” The government enacts and enforces 
the regulations necessary for markets to exist. Among other things, the legal 
machinery creates property rights, enforces contracts, and defines tortious conduct, 
and in so doing establishes the groundwork for market exchange. Bernard Harcourt 
succinctly demolishes the “naturalism of the market” fallacy: “The idea of a self-
regulated market is preposterous . . . [and] would be like a competitive sporting 
event without a referee: it would not work, nor has it ever worked.”22 
In shaping markets, government at all levels routinely restricts the scope of 
competition. Buy American is hardly a unique case of positive government 
restriction on competitive markets. For instance, child labor, minimum wage, and 
product safety laws, by design, restrain market competition and advance important 
social goals. Children are not allowed to work full-time jobs even though this 
proscription violates an abstract commitment to “competition” in the labor market. 
State and federal law also prohibit the sale of shoddy, unsafe products, 
notwithstanding that prohibitions on, say, cars with exploding gas tanks limit 
competition in goods markets and may raise consumer prices. As these examples 
show, government limitations on competition are sometimes essential for 
promoting the general welfare. And even regulations that restrict the growth of 
emerging technologies are not always undesirable. These rules can, for example, 
                                                                                                             
 
22 HARCOURT, supra note 2, at 196. 
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promote consumer safety and need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis23—not 
glibly dismissed as archaic and harmful. 
To be sure, the public must be on guard against government regulations that 
enrich well-heeled incumbents. They can and do exist. Congress’ dramatic 
expansion of intellectual property rights in recent decades is a prominent example 
of powerful private entities using government to restrict competition and sacrifice 
the public good.24 But governmental restrictions on competition are not 
intrinsically bad. It would be a mistake to assume that all government barriers to 
competition serve the affluent and well-connected at the expense of everyone else. 
At the same time, McWane’s anticompetitive conduct is a reminder that 
vigilance toward private barriers to open markets is essential. Unlike democratic 
governments, powerful corporations face little public accountability. The business 
historian Alfred Chandler observed that, due to the rise of large corporations, “the 
visible hand of management [has] replaced the invisible hand of market 
mechanisms”25 in a modern economy. In highly concentrated markets, this visible 
hand has power not only over present outcomes but can also control the long-term 
development of an industry. And monopolists and oligopolists exercise their power 
to advance their own interests, regardless of the consequences for the rest of us. In 
effect, many modern markets are not competitive but rather governed by private 
regulatory power. 
Health care—a sector that now accounts for 17 percent of the U.S. gross 
domestic product26—illustrates the enormous power of private entities. Hospital 
chains with monopoly power in local markets are a leading contributor to the 
exorbitant cost of health care in the United States.27 These entities impose massive 
markups on nearly everything they provide to patients—from Tylenol to 
chemotherapy.28 And they can also use their existing clout to exclude competitors. 
For example, by restricting insurers from contracting with smaller rival providers, 
dominant hospitals can foreclose competition and preserve their pricing power.29 
On the internet, giants like Amazon, Comcast, and Google, already wield 
                                                                                                             
 
23 See e.g., Dean Baker, Don’t Buy the ‘Sharing Economy’ Hype: Airbnb and Uber Are 
Facilitating Rip-Offs, GUARDIAN (May 27, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
commentisfree/2014/may/27/airbnb-uber-taxes-regulation. 
24 See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, Intellectual Property’s Leviathan, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 131, 144 (2014) (“[The] ‘Mickey Mouse’ Copyright Term Extension Act . . . 
lengthened copyright protection by two decades, not only prospectively but also 
retroactively (to better incentivize Walt Disney, God rest his soul?).”). 
25 ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN 
AMERICAN BUSINESS 6 (1977). 
26 Health Expenditures, Total, THE WORLD BANK (2013), http://data.worldbank.org/ 
indicator/ SH.XPD.TOTL.ZS. 
27 See, e.g., Uwe E. Reinhardt, Peter S. Hussey & Varduhi Petrosyan, It’s the Prices 
Stupid: Why the United States Is So Different from Other Countries, 22 HEALTH AFFAIRS 89, 
102 (2003); Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, The Provider Monopoly Problem in 
Health Care, 89 OR. L. REV. 847, 854–58 (2011).  
28 See generally Steven Brill, Bitter Pill: Why Medical Bills Are Killing Us, TIME (March 
4, 2014), available at http://time.com/198/bitter-pill-why-medical-bills-are-killing-us/#198/ 
bitter-pill-why-medical-bills-are-killing-us/. 
29 See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Reaches Settlement with 
Texas Hospital Prohibiting Anticompetitive Contracts with Health Insurers (Feb. 25, 2011), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-settlement-texas-
hospital-prohibiting-anticompetitive-contracts. 
2015] Public and Private Power in the Market 21 
 
tremendous power over what we buy and view and also have the ability to decide 
the fate of content providers. They can use their platforms to hobble and even 
eliminate competitive threats and perpetuate their dominance. Amazon wields 
tremendous power over the book world,30 and can intimidate even very large 
publishers.31 And some have alleged that Amazon has sold popular e-book titles at 
below-cost prices to maintain its dominance in this new market.32 Today, Comcast 
provides broadband service to approximately 25 percent of Americans—a figure 
that would have risen to around one-third if the company had been allowed to 
acquire Time Warner Cable.33 Because they must rely on Comcast’s broadband 
bottleneck to reach one-fourth of Americans, content providers and competitors, 
like Netflix, are effectively at the mercy of the Philadelphia-based cable 
behemoth.34 Google, the dominant search engine in much of the world, can 
manipulate its algorithm to favor its own services and starve rivals of visibility.35 
These examples show that economic power is more than just a matter of high prices 
and can also implicate core values such as the freedom of expression. 
Unfortunately, over the past several decades, the Supreme Court has displayed 
great faith in the beneficence of dominant corporations. On the basis of 
conservative economic theory, it has established permissive antitrust rules. 
Whether it is on the question of monopolists dealing with competitors36 or 
engaging in predatory pricing,37 the Supreme Court has opted to expand corporate 
autonomy and abandon antitrust law’s historical commitment to keep markets open 
                                                                                                             
 
30 United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“With nearly a 
90% market share for e-books in 2009, Amazon was the single most important seller of 
e-books in America, and also a dominant seller of physical books.”). 
31 See, e.g., David Streitfeld & Melissa Eddy, As Publishers Fight Amazon, Books 
Vanish, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2014, 7:24 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/23/ 
amazon-escalates-its-battle-against-hachette/ (“The battle is being waged largely over 
physical books. In the United States, Amazon has been discouraging customers from buying 
titles from Hachette, the fourth-largest publisher by market share. Late Thursday, it escalated 
the dispute by making it impossible to order Hachette titles being issued this summer and 
fall.”). 
32 Drew Sandholm, Amazon’s ‘Predatory Pricing’ Questioned, CNBC (June 30, 2014), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/101799842#. 
33 Timothy B. Lee, The Comcast/Time Warner Deal Isn’t about Competition. It’s about 
Power., WASH. POST THE SWITCH (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ 
the-switch/wp/2014/02/19/the-comcasttime-warner-deal-isnt-about-competition-its-about-
power/. 
34 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Comcast Corporation Abandons Proposed Acquisition 
of Time Warner Cable After Justice Department and the Federal Communications 
Commission Informed Parties of Concerns (Apr. 24, 2015), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/comcast-corporation-abandons-proposed-acquisition-time-
warner-cable-after-justice-department; Zachary M. Seward, The Inside Story of How Netflix 
Came to Pay Comcast for Internet Traffic, QUARTZ (Aug. 27, 2014), http://qz.com/256586/ 
the-inside-story-of-how-netflix-came-to-pay-comcast-for-internet-traffic/. 
35 FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT 
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 67–69 (2015). 
36 Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 
(2004); Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009). 
37 Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
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and free of private blockades.38 Today, powerful businesses have broad freedom to 
smother competitors and close markets.  
Yet, even now, the Supreme Court’s conservative antitrust decisions do not 
necessarily make the monopolistic domination of markets a fait accompli. As 
McWane illustrates, even in this unfavorable legal environment, antitrust enforcers 
are by no stretch powerless to challenge monopolies. The federal antitrust agencies, 
the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, still have the 
capacity to limit the sweep of bad high court precedents through test cases. 
Encouragingly, the government and private plaintiffs have obtained favorable 
lower court rulings on monopolization claims in recent years, and avoided dreaded 
Supreme Court review.39 
Public policy, in seeking to protect competitive markets, must go beyond just 
aggressive enforcement of antitrust law. Sector-specific regulations such as 
network neutrality40 are a vital part of the competition policy regime and are 
necessary to curtail the power of large corporations. Other important solutions 
include the creation of public competitors that can discipline incumbent 




Government restrictions on competition, whether in the market for cars, hotel 
rooms, or taxicabs, have attracted a great deal of attention of late. As a basic 
matter, government is not exogenous to the market: a functioning state is, in reality, 
a precondition for modern markets. Because it establishes the rules necessary for 
markets to develop and potentially flourish, government unavoidably shapes the 
bounds and structures of the private economic sphere. And more specifically, 
public limitations on competition are not intrinsically hostile to the interests of 
ordinary Americans and can, in fact, advance vital social goals, such as full 
employment and public safety. Accounting for these considerations, governmental 
                                                                                                             
 
38 See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (“Antitrust laws in 
general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are 
as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the 
Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms. And the freedom 
guaranteed each and every business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete—to 
assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can 
muster.”). 
39 See, e.g., ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 
133 S. Ct. 2024 (2013); United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005), 
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1023 (2006); Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 431 
F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2005), reh’g denied, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 10603 (6th Cir. Apr. 13, 
2006); LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 
2932 (2004). 
40 Rebecca R. Ruiz & Steve Lohr, F.C.C. Approves Net Neutrality Rules, Classifying 
Broadband Internet Service as a Utility, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2015), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/27/technology/net-neutrality-fcc-vote-internet-utility.html. 
41 See, e.g., Dominic Rushe, Chattanooga’s Gig: How One City’s Super-Fast Internet Is 
Driving a Tech Boom, GUARDIAN (Aug. 30, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/ 
aug/30/chattanooga-gig-high-speed-internet-tech-boom (“Thanks to an ambitious roll-out by 
the city’s municipally owned electricity company, EPB, Chattanooga is one of the only 
places on Earth with internet at speeds as fast as 1 gigabit per second—about 50 times faster 
than the US average.”). 
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restraints should not be blindly condemned as harmful; rather, they should be 
examined on a case-by-case basis. Even aggressive newcomers with savvy public 
relations (such as Airbnb, Tesla, and Uber) and giddy talk of “disruption” should 
not lead us to denounce legal restrictions on these actors as a matter of reflex. 
Critically, the present focus on public restraints should not mean that private 
efforts to create closed markets get a free pass. In contrast to democratic public 
authorities, large corporations face little accountability. Dominant firms can use 
predatory and other exclusionary methods to maintain their long-run supremacy 
and prosper through exploitation of the public. Given the awesome power of 
monopolistic and oligopolistic corporations, antitrust enforcers and other regulators 
must reassert public discipline over private empires. 
 
